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12 November 1954

Senator William E. Jenner Senate Internal Security Subcommittee Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Listed below are the answers to the questions set forth in your letter of 11 October 1954. I regret the delay in answering them and trust you will pardon me. I hope my answers may be of some value.

- 1. Q. From the context of your story, we are uncertain as to when you were first taken across the Yalu to Manchuria to start air training. Was it August or September of 1951 and approximately what day of the month? We would like to pin-point it in connection with the Inchon landing and the subsequent crossing of the 38th parallel.
- 1. A. September 25, 1951, after the Inchon landing and after the Chinese entry into the Korean War.
- 2. Q. Can you fix the month and the approximate date of the month when you were first told there was no danger of American bombing across the Yalu because Americans were afraid to start World War III?
- 2. A. I am not positive of the exact date, but it was either late November or December of 1950. At the time I was at Yenki; however, despite the information we were given that the Americans would not bomb us, we, nevertheless, dug foxholes and troop installations were moved to the sides of the mountains surrounding Yenki.
- 3. Q. When did you first know American pilots were forbidden "hot pursuit"?
  - 3. A. In December 1950 while at Yenki.
  - 4. Q. You say you graduated in March 1951 -- can you specify the date?
  - 4. A. 7 March 1951
- 5. Q. Since you were then (at the time of graduation--7 March 1951) assigned to jet training, it would appear that your superiors were quite sure of being able to "buy time" -- as they did, pending completion of your training. Your story appears to support General MacArthur's assertion that

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we could have won in the Fall of 1950 and General Van Fleet's assertion that we had another chance to win in May of 1951. We are particularly interested in establishing that, throughout, the enemy knew no action against the "sanctuary" would be taken.

5. A. It was common knowledge that the Communists needed Korean jet pilots for propaganda purposes -- namely, to show that North Koreans were not only well trained, but also were actively engaged in jet action against the UN. At first, during the early part of the Korean War, there were only Russian jet pilots in action, next the Chinese jet pilots were used; and, finally, after training, the North Koreans. The day before graduation (7 March 1951) Russians came to our airfield from Anshan and selected the North Korean pilots who had completed basic air training to go to a special jet school. After they had interviewed the class, we were informed that we were not well qualified at all, but that they (the Russians) had already set up the training syllabus. They told us that the Commanding General, however, had made the statement that we North Koreans should finish our jet training in the Summer of 1951; but as it was, we did not complete the training until October 1951. The training period throughout was very hurried.

Very truly yours,

No Kum Sok (Kenneth No, Brown Hall, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware)